Analysing the Diversity of the Shari’ah Board Membership in Saudi Banks in Light of the Instructions of the Saudi Central Bank

Ziad Mohammad Obeidat

Sa’dud Bin Abd AlRahman Bin Naqthan

Fairouz Ahmad Bahlaq

Mohammed Nadem Dabaghia

 

Abstract: This article examines the Shariʿah and regulatory implications of multiple memberships on Shariʿah boards within Saudi banks, assessing how such practices influence the quality of fatwa (juristic opinion), the independence of Shariʿah decision‑making, and compliance with the Saudi Central Bank (SAMA) governance framework. Using a descriptive‑analytical method, the article reviews existing regulations, documents the prevalence and patterns of multiple memberships, and situates the Saudi case within comparative models from Jordan, Malaysia, Bahrain, and the United Arab Emirates. The analysis reveals a high concentration of Shariʿah board positions among a small group of scholars, a pattern that risks diminishing fatwa quality, creating conflicts of interest, and undermining institutional independence. It further finds partial compliance with SAMA’s requirements and identifies gaps in oversight mechanisms. The article argues that unregulated multiplicity of board membership weakens Shariʿah governance and threatens the credibility of Islamic financial operations. It recommends setting a legal ceiling on permissible memberships, diversifying and professionalising Shariʿah boards, adopting robust conflict‑of‑interest safeguards, enhancing SAMA’s supervisory role, and evaluating the establishment of a national centralised Shariʿah board. Together, these measures will strengthen Shariʿah governance, promote independence, and ensure the integrity of Islamic banking practices in Saudi Arabia.